Background Autism self-advocates’ views regarding genetic tests for autism are important, but critical questions about their perspectives arise.Methods We interviewed 11 autism self-advocates, recruited through autism self-advocacy websites, for 1 h each.Results Interviewees viewed genetic testing and its potential pros and cons through the lens of their own indiviudal perceived challenges, needs and struggles, especially concerning stigma and discrimination, lack of accommodations and misunderstandings from society about autism, their particular needs for services, and being blamed by others and by themselves (...) for autistic traits. Their views of genetic testing tended not to be binary, but rather depended on how the genetic test results would be used. Interviewees perceived pros of genetic testing both in general and with regard to themselves (e.g., by providing “scientific proof” of autism as a diagnosis and possibly increasing availability of services). But they also perceived disadvantages and limitations of testing (e.g., possible eugenic applications). Participants distinguished between what they felt would be best for themselves and for the autistic community as a whole. When asked if they would undergo testing for themselves, if offered, interviewees added several considerations (e.g., undergoing testing because they support science in general). Interviewees were divided whether a genetic diagnosis would or should reduce self-blame, and several were wary of testing unless treatment, prevention or societal attitudes changed. Weighing these competing pros and cons could be difficult.Conclusions This study, the first to use in-depth qualitative interviews to assess views of autism self-advocates regarding genetic testing, highlights key complexities. Respondents felt that such testing is neither wholly good or bad in itself, but rather may be acceptable depending on how it is used, and should be employed in beneficial, not harmful ways. These findings have important implications for practice, education of multiple stakeholders, research, and policy. (shrink)

On one hand, Chinese consumers are well known for conspicuous consumption and the adoption of luxury products and named brands. On the other hand, they also have a bad reputation for buying counterfeit products. Their simultaneous preferences for two contrasting types of product present a paradox that has not been addressed in the literature. This study attempts to present an explanation of this paradox by examining the effects of traditional Chinese cultural values and consumer values on consumers’ deontological judgment of (...) pirated CDs and the amount of social benefits they perceive they gain from them. We interviewed 300 Hong Kong Chinese consumers, and found that face consciousness increased materialism and risk aversion, thereby producing a favorable deontological judgment of pirated CDs. Face consciousness also has a direct effect on the amount of social benefits perceived in pirated CDs. Both favorable deontological judgment and perceived social benefits contributed to a strong intention to buy pirated CDs. The results are discussed in a cultural perspective. (shrink)

This book provides practical and research-based chapters that offer greater clarity about the particular kinds of teacher reflection that matter and avoids talking about teacher reflection generically, which implies that all kinds of reflection are of equal value.

Rapid handwriting, popularly known as shorthand, involves writing symbols and abbreviations in lieu of common words or phrases. This method increases the speed of transcription and is primarily used to record oral dictation. Someone skilled in shorthand will be able to write as fast as the dictation occurs, and these patterns are later transliterated into actual, natural language words. A new kind of rapid handwriting scheme is proposed, called the Pattern-Based Shorthand. A word on a keyboard involves pressing a unique (...) sequence of keys in a particular order. This sequence forms a pattern that defines the word. Such a pattern forms the shorthand for that word. Speech recognition involves identifying, by a machine, the words spoken by a speaker. These spoken words form speech input signals to a computer that is equipped to correctly recognize the words and do further action, such as convert it to text. From this text input, unique shorthand patterns are generated by the system. The system employs machine learning to improve its performance with experience, by creating a dictionary of mappings from word to patterns in such a way that the access to existing patterns is faster with progression. This forms a new knowledge representation schema that reduces the redundancy in the storage of words and the length of information content. In conclusion, the speech is converted into textual form and then reconstructed into Pattern-Based Shorthand. (shrink)

This volume offers a collection of in-depth explorations of pragmatism as a framework for discussions in philosophy of science and metaphysics. Each chapter involves explicit reflection on what it means to be pragmatist, and how to use pragmatism as a guiding framework in addressing topics such as realism, unification, fundamentality, truth, laws, reduction, and more. -/- .

The title essay was originally presented as two lectures inaugurating the John Dewey lectures at Columbia. It is an important essay for understanding Quine's work for it brings together many themes at the center of his thinking since Word and Object. Quine quotes with approval Dewey's statement "meaning is primarily a property of behavior" and then goes on to consider a thesis which, according to Quine, is a consequence of such a behavioral theory of meaning, i.e., the thesis of the (...) indeterminacy of meaning and translation. Quine relates this indeterminacy thesis, which he has been defending for some time, to language learning, the foundations of mathematics, and to a general view of ontological relativity. Other essays in the volume concern natural kinds and the various paradoxes of confirmation, propositional objects, quantification and existence and the empirical basis of science. All the essays are post-1965 except the introductory essay which was Quine's Presidential Address to the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association in 1956. This address was something of an introduction to the ideas to appear in Word and Object and is placed at the beginning of this collection to emphasize that all the essays collected here expand on and defend some of the positions of Word and Object. Quine's fluid style is everywhere in evidence.--R. H. K. (shrink)

This work gives a fresh approach to the discussion of psychological phenomena in philosophical terms. Beginning with a discussion of the emotions and feelings, it works back to a theory of willing and judging. The method is analytic, and the influence of Wittgenstein and Ryle is everywhere in evidence, though in different ways: the author usually improves on what Ryle, but simply approves of what Wittgenstein, says. In the final two chapters, the theory of judgment put forward by Geach in (...) Mental Acts is modified and extended to apply to acts of will, in the light of what has been said in the earlier chapters about emotions, feelings and desires.--R. H. K. (shrink)

A comprehensive introduction to modal logic is long overdue and this one has many virtues. It is clearly written and should be accessible to any student who has at least one semester of basic logic and is willing to read carefully and think abstractly. The first part, on modal propositional logic, begins with a summary account of classical propositional logic, the axiomatization of Principia Mathematica being the basis for the development of modal logics throughout the book. The transition to modal (...) logic is nicely motivated by a clear presentation of intuitive notions of modality and the requirements to be included in a modal logic. Thereafter three standard systems of modal propositional logic are developed axiomatically, Feys' system T and Lewis' systems S4 and S5. The semantics for these systems is then developed in the manner of Kripke with some terminological modifications. The explanation of accessibility relations between possible worlds is made especially clear through a helpful analogy with certain sorts of games. Decision procedures and completeness proofs are then developed. A similar pattern of exposition is given to modal predicate logic in Part II, the difference being that Henkin-type methods are used in the completeness proofs. Because of the many philosophical problems raised by modal predicate logic, Part II contains more philosophical discussion than Part I. A discussion of identity and descriptions in modal predicate logic is also included. The third and final part is a survey of modal systems beginning with the Lewis' systems S1-S5 and going on to systems weaker and stronger than the Lewis' systems and others which are independent of them. Systems with alternative primitives and axiomatic bases are also discussed. A final chapter discusses the relation of Boolean algebras to modal logics and brief appendices deal with natural deduction systems of modal logic, systems of entailment, alternative notations and the semantics of Kripke and Hintikka among other topics. There are exercises at the end of each chapter. This summary suggests the merits of this introduction, its clear exposition and the enormous amount of material it brings together and summarizes.--R. H. K. (shrink)

This book is far more than an exposition of Frege's logical system and semantic concepts, although it is that. The author puts forward the challenging thesis that in trying to cope with Russell's paradox Frege deserted principles of his system which he had relied on throughout. Sternfeld attempts to show, by offering his own interpretation of Frege's logical theory, that if Frege had relied consistently on his previously formulated logical principles, Russell's paradox would have given him no trouble. Further, he (...) uses these arguments as a basis for defending the general thesis that paradoxes and other difficulties with various logical systems can only be discussed relative to the philosophical principles underlying the logical system and adopted independently of it. While these are the most challenging of the book's theses they are not its only topics. The author seems to have read everything by and about Frege and is in control of his material. There will undoubtedly be disagreements over his interpretation of Frege because Frege did not write to make expositors happy. But all students of Frege, as well as students of the philosophy of logic and philosophy of mathematics, will find this book rewarding.--R. H. K. (shrink)

Leibniz' General Investigations, a group of memoranda on logical and methodological matters, remained unpublished until Couturat published the original Latin manuscript in 1903. Only after 1960 was a German translation made by F. Schmidt and an English translation by G. H. R. Parkinson. The present translation provides extensive reference notes to Leibniz' other manuscripts, and a commentary and notes to the text. In these respects it has some advantages over previous translations. The translation is clear although the work itself is (...) sometimes difficult to follow and the notes are most welcome. An introduction discusses the place of the General Investigations within the context of Leibniz' thought. With the interest in Leibniz' logical writings very strong at present, this new translation and commentary is most welcome.--R. H. K. (shrink)

The author offers some interesting suggestions for the rewriting of the history of logic which modern developments in symbolic logic demand. He divides the history into two parts, the first dealing with what is called the Aristotelian core of logic and the improvements made on that core within a basically classical tradition, and the second, with the tradition of improvements inspired by Leibniz' idea of mathematical logic. The book is brief and much less of a comprehensive history than a prolegomena.--R. (...) H. K. (shrink)

A book which attempts to introduce the reader to current problems in the philosophy of science, and at the same time to provide a new and significant treatment of some of these problems. The "modest empiricism" which Scheffler has espoused in a number of previous publications is given a detailed presentation in a study of historical attempts to provide meaning for three crucial concepts in the field: explanation, signification and confirmation.--R. H. K.

A painstaking examination of theories of good and right in twentieth century British thought leads the author back to Kant, whose views are in turn exposed and criticized. Out of these investigations is developed a theory of good in terms of the dignity of man, which will account for the Kantian ideas of obligation and autonomy, yet give material content to ethical judgments. The concluding thesis is a challenge that an ultimate choice is required between the book's humanitarian view of (...) morality and maximalist views. No compromise is possible. The arguments are clear, cogent, and provocative. --R. H. K. (shrink)

This is the second volume in the new monograph series sponsored by the American Philosophical Quarterly and judging by the high quality of most of the essays in this collection the idea for such a series seems to be a good one. A wide variety of topics in contemporary philosophical logic are discussed in seven essays, as suggested by the following brief account of their contents: Montgomery Furth's "Two Types of Denotation" is a careful study of Frege's views of denotation, (...) function, and object which manages to make some original suggestions as well as to clear up some confusing features of Frege's discussion. Jaako Hintikka's "Language Games for Quantifiers" develops interesting connections between the uses of quantifiers and various verbs related to seeking and finding and with these connections in mind offers a game theoretic interpretation of quantifiers. J. W. Cornman's admirably clear essay "Types, Categories and Nonsense" discusses the views of Ryle, Russell, Black, Pap, and Sommers on categories and types, formulating criteria of type difference close to that of Sommers. In "A Theory of Conditionals," R. C. Stalnaker takes some clues from the semantical analysis of modal logics in order to present an analysis of 'if... then...' statements and to deal with some epistemological problems about counterfactuals. In "Goodman's Nominalism," A. Hausman and C. Echelberger discuss certain facts which, in their view, no nominalist ontology, including Goodman's can deal with. Ted Honderlich's "Truth: Austin, Strawson, Warnock" is a discussion of Austin's views on truth and some of the confusions surrounding commentary on and criticism of it. Honderlich suggests his own definition of truth in the article. Finally, Colwyn Williamson in "Propositions andPropositions" discusses the various arguments which have been put forward to show that propositions are entities of a sort distinct from sentences. He rejects all such arguments as well as their conclusion.--R. H. K. (shrink)

Originally published as a long essay in Mind and Cosmos, Volume II of the University of Pittsburgh series in the philosophy of science, this study admirably fills the need for an elementary survey of problems in the area of probability and induction. But it is more than an introduction. The author is working on the general thesis that Bayes' theorem of the probability calculus holds the key to the understanding of scientific inference. Guided by this idea he attempts to salvage (...) what he thinks is of value in various current theories of probability and scientific inference, particularly, the frequency theory of probability as defended by Reichenbach, Popper's views on the falsifiability of theories, and Hanson's work on the logic of discovery. These attempts to develop a theory in the latter part of the book follow discussions of Hume's critique of induction, the probability calculus and five past and present interpretations of the calculus. This is a well-written and challenging introduction to the field.—R. H. K. (shrink)

In spite of the title, the author of this book asserts that its primary aim is to offer a reasonable account of the concepts of possibility and potentiality. His analysis of these concepts allows him to approach the free will controversy in his own way and to offer many interesting analyses and arguments bearing on the issue. He distinguishes three kinds of non-logical possibility: epistemic or relative possibility, natural possibility or natural power, and possibility of choice or personal power. He (...) thinks that the arguments for determinism have been based in one way or another on a failure to notice the subtle differences which exist between these three kinds of non-logical possibility. Although there is room for doubt that his analysis adds up to a decisive refutation of determinism, he has found many interesting differences between kinds of possibility and potentiality which bear on the free will issue and other philosophical issues as well. There is a discernible influence of Ryle and Austin on the book although both of these philosophers come in for criticism, especially Ryle for his failure to carefully separate the different meanings of 'power', 'tendency', 'capacity', and similar terms, and for his general commitment to the notion that all power is conditional. This latter thesis is one of the author's main targets.--R. H. K. (shrink)

In this book the author develops his own systems of and semantics for presupposition free logic. He calls his systems logics without existence assumptions, by which he means logical systems which are sound and complete with respect to a semantic theory in which a universe of discourse can be empty but any term which denotes must denote something in the universe, all predicates including identity represent relations holding among members of the universe and the quantifiers range over just all the (...) members of the universe. In a brief introductory chapter the author reviews the motivations for constructing non-standard logics of this kind and briefly discusses what he takes to be the limitations of previous work done in the field. Persons interested in the philosophical problems and uses of such logics are likely to find this chapter interesting though disappointingly brief. Four of the eight chapters are devoted to the development of a natural deduction system N which is a logic without existence assumptions in the author's sense. The system N is shown to be sound and complete with respect to the author's semantics. An axiomatic system L is later developed and shown to be equivalent to N. The final chapter is devoted to discussing the relation of his work to many-valued logics, modal logics, intuitionistic logic and the theory of classes among other topics. The author believes that logics without existence assumptions "will in the long run displace the less natural and more narrow standard logics."--R. H. K. (shrink)

In this British Academy lecture, Popper argues for a reformulation of epistemological questions. In the past we have asked for the ultimate sources of knowledge and thus begged for authoritarian answers. He charges that this question of origins is relevant to the determination of meaning but not to the determination of truth. The historical sections are often interesting in their own right, especially those on the conspiracy theory of ignorance.--R. H. K.

This is a careful analytical study of some of the central concepts of contemporary political thought. In separate chapters the author deals with the concepts of liberty, loyalty, power, and tolerance, exposing in the process some of the contradictions and confusions of contemporary American liberal and conservative thought. In the first chapter, which takes its point of departure from J. S. Mill's writings on liberty and political economy, Wolff shows that conservatives and liberals in the U.S. often share common principles (...) but disagree over the relevant facts. Since he thinks liberals have usually been right about the facts they have come, in his opinion, to dominate political debates. But the principles themselves need questioning, according to Wolff, and he formulates his own alternative in a final chapter entitled "Community." His aim in this final chapter is to rehabilitate the notion of the general or public good as distinct from the sum of the private goods of individuals, without falling into the totalitarian mold of various theories of the general good during the past few centuries. His ideas are not fully worked out in this chapter but they are interesting and stimulating. The other chapters on loyalty, power, and tolerance exemplify the two virtues which the book as a whole possesses. On the one hand they contain a careful analysis of the concepts involved, and on the other hand they represent a successful attempt to relate the analysis to current political problems.--R. H. K. (shrink)